Fra Humeansk non-kognitivisme til Mackies fejlteori og Blackburns kvasi-realisme

Abstract

In this project we examine the non-cognitivism of David Hume and how it compares to the errortheory of John L. Mackie and the quasi-realism of Simon Blackburn. We do this by investigating their meta-ethical theories from which we try to reach an understanding of moral expression, the projection of sentiments and the ostensible error in our moral judgments. We also elaborate on the possibility of Mackie’s more normative theory, the inventing of morals, to which Blackburn also gives an answer. The project furthermore includes various points of criticism regarding the errortheory and the quasi-realism. Moreover, we reach a valuation of the fairness in both theories as we assess which one of the theories that has the best potential of answering the question of which role moral has in our modern naturalistic and non-cognitivistic world.